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INTRODUCTION
Sweden's foreign policy toward Nazi Germany during World War Two makes for 
an Interesting case study because the country faced so many dllemas. The coun­
try's foreign policy makers tad to answer questions such as: Can Sweden afford 
to be neutral at a time when a ruthless dictator threatened all of Europe and 
who. If successful In his war, would undoubtably attack Sweden sooner or later? 
What price should Sweden be willing to pay to stay out of the war In the face 
of German demands which Infringe upon a "strict neutrality"? Is 1t morally 
justifiable to make concessions to Germany which contribute to Its war drive, 
such as Its occupation of Norway, In order to avoid German reprisals?
This paper will examine the manner In which Swedish forelgh policy makers 
dealt with the above questions. In addition, the goals behind Sweden's neutral­
ity polity will be examined, as well as theories of how Sweden avoided the war. 
They provide the framework 1n which the foreign policy makers tad to work. The 
historical development of Swedish neutrality will be dealt with 1n Chapter 1, 
while the goals In which the policy was based on will be dealt with 1n Chapter 
2. Theories of how Sweden avoided the war will be considered 1n Chapter 3.
After providing the context In which Swedish neutrality tad to operate, 
the following chapters will examine specific cases In which Sweden's neutral­
ity was tested by Germany. Chapter 4 discusses Sweden's controversial Iron ore 
and ball bearing exports to Germany; Chapter S examines German troop transfers 
through Sweden to Norway; and Chapter 6 treats German troop transports through 
Sweden to Finland. Chapter 7 looks at German attempts to Influence Sweden's 
domestic policy. Finally, Chapter 8 considers the question: Was Sweden's 
foreign policy morally Justifiable?
PART I
THE BACKGROUND 
TO
SWEDEN'S FOREIGN POLICY
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THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF t«l£01SH NEUTRALITY
Swedish neutrality differs from the "traditional" neutrality 1n the sense
that It Is self-imposed and can be abandoned 1f the government decides to change
Its foreign policy.' In contrast, most neutral countries have their neutrality
guaranteed by other countries through International treaties. Belglam's former
neutrality was guaranteed by Russia, Brltlan, Austria, France and Prussia In the
Treaty of 1839. Other countries following this pattern are Luxembourg and Austria.
Even Switzerland's neutrality was granted through the treaty of Vienna In IBIS,
although according to Roderick Ogley, the country was "originally neutral by 
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choice," and has been for the last century. ’
ORIGINS OF SWEDISH NEUTRALITY
Peter Lyon p’aces the beginning of Sweden's neutralism at the end of Its 
last war In 1813. According to him, the policy began after Sweden had supported 
Brltlan 1n the final Napoleonic war, "because realistic appraisals of national 
strength always moderated any Initial Impulse to adopt an adventurous foreign 
policy.'1® Nils Andren regards Swedish foreign policy at this time as "the peace 
policy of a small and weak state, (which) was as yet hardly a policy of delib­
erate 'neutrality.'"* He also notes that Sweden had still entertained hopes of 
regaining Finland until the middle of the 19th century.
In fact, Sweden came close to entering wars several times In the mid 1800s.
W. M. Carlgren points out that Sweden considered entering wars against the 
German Confederation In 1848, Russia In 1856 and Prussla-Austrla In 1863.®
Since 1863 was the last time Sweden seriously considered entering a war, Rolf
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CHAPTER 1
Karlboa chooses it as tha starting point of Sweden's "strict* neutrality.* 
However, the Swedish critic, Roland Huntford, mentions that "the Swedes did 
not make their profession as a neutral until the outbreak of the First World 
Mar."7
The discussion above shows that there Is no wide agreement as to when 
Swedish neutrality "really" began. Huntford is Of the opinion *hat Sweden 
waited until the wsr broke out. because it was an opportunistic decision based 
on the realization that Sweden's economy would benefit most by avoiding war, 
and subsequently carrying out extensive trade with Germany. Although this may 
have been the motivation behind many Conservatives in the government. It should 
be noted that Sweden had a growing peace movement which was heavily supported 
by Socialist and many Liberal politicians. The peace movement had been cam­
paigning since the middle 1850's for officially declared neutrality on moralistic 
grounds. In fact, this movement 1s often given credit for preventing a war with 
Norway when the latter dissolved the Swedlsh-Norweglan union in 1905. So the 
conservative government's decision to declare Itself neutral during World War I 
was probably Influenced as much by the strong neutral sentiment within public 
opinion as by the calculation that it served the country's economic Interests. 
Finally, It should be noted that this conflict between conservatives who were 
willing to follow a more economically opportunistic; pro-German policy, and a more 
moralistic left favoring a strict neutrality, reoccurred during World War II.
SWEDISH NEUTRALITY DURING WORLD WAR ONE
Despite Sweden's declared neutrality, conservative and upper-class circles 
often displayed pro-German sentiment.® During the early years of World War I,
In which a Conservative government was In power, Swedish trade policy favored 
Germany.*® However, when the Liberals came to power In October 1917, they were 
attached by conservatives for being pro-West. Regardless of whether a group was
"pro-German* or "pro-West," th* overwhelming consensus ms that Sweden should stay 
out of th* war.11
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
Aftar World War 1 ended, Sweden entered the League of Nations, with th* hop* 
that the international organization could guarantee Sweden's and Europe's security. 
Anren claims that Sweden's entry into the League "meant at least in form a de­
viation from the deliberate policy of neutrality...."'2 Th* reason being that the 
League had the power to use military force against other nations. As a partici­
pant In the League, Sweden could consequently be called upon to send its soldiers 
to fight against a country in which the League demanded sanctions again. He adds 
that although the charter was originally set-up for the victorious powers of World 
War I, Sweden supported the defeated powers' entry Into the League.
Once the Immense military build-up by the super-powers began in the 1930's, 
Sweden started questioning the League's ability to maintain peace in Europe. The 
Swedes also worried that adherence to the League's sanctions could draw them into 
war, so In 1936 the country announced that it was no longer bound by the League's
sanctions. In addition, the country began a rearmament program that year in order
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to disuade the Great Powers from Invading if war were to break out.
THE SOVIET-FINNISH WAR
When the Soviet Union attacked Finland, on November 30, 1940. Sweden did
not declare itself neutral. Irene Scobble characterizes Sweden's policy as having
been "non-belligerent" during this war.14 At the beginning of the war, only
humanitarian and economic aid was given to Finland, but eventually Mr materials
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and volunteers were sent. The total number of Swedish volunteers sent there has 
been calculated to be 9,000, while the amount of aid given has been estimated at 
around 400 million Swedish crowns.1* Lars Krantz lists 22 planes, 75 anti-tank
guns, 250 cannons and 90.000 rtflas among Sweden's military aid to Finland.17 
Sweden's assistance to Finland obviously deviated from Its polity of neutrality.
Sweden justified Its support of Finland In Its "Winter Iter" with Russia on 
the ground of Its "local character. * In contrast to the German occupation of 
Denmark and Norway, which Involved several superpowers (France, Britian and 
Germany), the Sovlet-Flnnlsh confrontation was seen as a conflict between two 
neighbors. Since Finland happened to be Sweden's neighbor and a Scandinavian 
one at that, It was Sweden's duty to help Finland fend off Russia'sattack.1*
Critics of Sweden's Finnish policy claim that the real objective was to 
fight communism rather than to help a neighbor. Many communists were particularly 
bitter that the government encouraged volunteers fight against communism, while 
only a few years earlier forbidding volunteers to travel to Spain In order to 
fight against fascism.20
CONCLUSION
Even though Sweden has not fought In a war since 1813, the above examples 
show that Its neutral policy has not prevented Its leaders from sympathizing 
with warring countries. During World War I, the Conservatives were supportive of 
Germany, while many Liberals were pro-West. During the Winter War, most non- 
Communlsts favored Finland, and the Social Democratic government faced heavy 
pressure from Conservatives to sharply Increase Sweden's Finnish commitment.
In simulation. It can be said that although most politicians accepted the Idea of 
neutrality, they saw It In the narrow sense of not entering alliances or engag*
Ing In official military operations on the side of a warring nation. Furthermore, 
as this paper will show, when 1t appeared that Germany would win the war, some 
Conservative and military leaders even favored openly abandoning the policy of 
neutrality in order to help Germany's war against the Soviet Union.
THE AIM OF SWEDEN'S FOREIGN POLICY
After the outbreak of World War 11, the legal advisor to the Swedish
Foreign Ministry, listen Unden, stated that Sweden would follow a policy of strict
21
neutrality based on the 1907 Haag Convention. In a speech given by Prime 
Minister Per Albln Hansson on June 29, 1941, he used a looser definition of 
neutrality by stating that "the central point In our (Sweden's) policy thu whole
jo
time has been to seek to keep us (Sweden) out of war. ‘ Less than two months
later, Defence Minister Per Edvln Skdld added retention of full Independence to
23
Hansson1s goal of keeping Sweden out of war. The statements by Mansion and 
Skold imply that by 1941, Swedish leaders were already prepared to make con* 
cessions which could help one great power win the war against the others. Con* 
sequently, Sweden had already given up its goal of following a policy of strict 
neutrality, in favor of a policy aimed at keeping the country out of war and 
maintaining its independence*
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also felt that Sweden should be prepared to 
depart from a policy of strict neutrality in order to remain out of the war. It 
was felt that the great powers would not respect the rules of International law 
regarding neutrality. Not only could Germany be expected to disregard neutrality 
laws in its quest for world domination, even the Allies would likely disregard 
these laws in order to defeat Hitler. So Sweden's neutrality in tne upcoming 
war would have to be different from the neutral policy it carried out during 
World War I.**
Since the great powers could not be expected to respect the rules of inter*
CHAPTER 2
net lone1 tar, Sweden felt it weld not be expected to follow them. Carlgren sums 
up Sweden's policy as follows: "The term 'e policy of neutrality' covered all 
Measures which served to keep Sweden out of wer, whether or not they were con­
sistent with the rules of neutrality in international law."2* Consequently, 
Sweden m s  will in# to *»k e  large concessions to Germany, such as allowing the 
transfer of German troops through Sweden to Norway and Finland, in order to 
prevent an invasion. In both of these cases, remaining out Of the war proved 
more important for Sweden then maintaining its neutrality.
CHAPTER 3
HOW SWIM* AVOIDED THE WAR
In resrospect, it is father surprising that Sudden was able to avoid being 
draped into World War II. All three of its Scandinavian neighbors became in­
volved 1n the war, even though they also tried to maintain a policy of neutrality 
when the war broke out, After the Soviet Union invaded Finland on November 30, 
1940, many Swedes worried that the Soviets would try to extend themselves west­
ward. Consequently, the Swedes were wilt inf to help their neighbor tight off the 
"Bolshevik threat." Sweden gave Finland military aid which included sending 
volunteers.28 In addition, a unity government was formed involving all of the 
non-Communist parties in parliament, so that the country would be united in its 
willingness to defend itself,22 Even though the Soviet threat seemed very real 
to many Swedes, few believed that either Germany or the Western Powers would 
consider invading Scandinavia. They assumed that it was in both sides1 interests 
to keep the area neutral as they did in World War I.
The German invasion of Denmark and Norway on April 9, 1940 changed the 
situation drastically. At the time of the invasions, Swedish forces had not 
been mobilised because the country’s leaders had still thought that they were 
safe from Invasion, despite intelligence reports that such an invasion had been 
planned.28 The Swedish leadership now realized that they were in fact susceptible 
to attack so they began mobilizing their military forces.
When Sweden was busy mobilizing its forces in April of that year, Germany 
demanded that it be allowed to send troops to Norway through Sweden,28 Sweden 
refused, arguing that it would be giving up its neutrality by helping one nation
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defeat i f other. However* once Norway capitulated, the Germans argued that the 
transports would no longer be helping it in a war. Fearing that a negative 
answer would lead to an invasion, Sweden agreed to the transport of both sick 
and vacationing soldiers through Sweden to and from Norway, as long as the number 
coming always equaled the numbers leaving.
After the transports were allowed in the summer of 1940, relations between
Germany and Sweden were fairly good. Sweden became almost totally dependent on
Germany for its imports after the Nazis blockaded the North Sea, but Norway
received favorable trade rates from Germany in return for Sweden’s iron ore and
30
ball bearing exports. Relations between the two countries worsened the follow­
ing spring when Sweden noticed that Germany was sending more soldiers to Norway 
than were returning. The transports continued from the end of February to the 
end of March because Germany needed to mobilize troops in preparation for its 
upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union. Sweden reluctantly agreed to the transfers 
but was able to set a limit which was much lower than the original German demands. 
When Germany was ready to launch its Invasion in the summer of that same year,
Sweden was faced with similar demands, only this time Germany demanded permission 
to transfer its troops from Norway to Finland through Sweden. Again, Sweden 
consented and 15,000 soldiers were sent to Finland, although later requests were 
turned down,
With German soldiers in Finland, Sweden found itself completely surrounded by 
Germany. Germany was supporting Finland to Sweden's east, while occupying Norway 
and Denmark to Sweden's west. In addition, Norway and Finland border Sweden's 
northern boundry, while Germany itself lies to Sweden's south. In spite of Sweden's 
weak bargaining position, the Finnish transfer was the last major concession that 
it made to Germany,
As the Allies improved their standing in the war, Sweden began receiving 
pressure from them to lower their trade with Germany and to cancel the troop
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transport agreements. In 1943* Sweden cancelled Its troop transport agreement 
with Germany, and the following year trade levels dropped off. 8y the end of 
1944, Swedish-German trade had almost completely stopped. A few months later, 
the war ended, and Sweden had managed to be one of the few European countries 
which had avoided the war.
How cound a small, isolated country, which was surrounded by one of the 
world's most powerful and expansionists countries avoid attack in a war in which 
the powerful country was aiming for world domination?
Many reasons have been given for Sweden's ability to avoid a Nazi attack.
The most Important of these can be classified into four different categories: 
luck, military, economic and political explanations.
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LUCK
It has been argued that factors outside Sweden's control played a large role 
in the country's ability to escape being attacked. The most commonly given 
factors pertain to the balance of power, Sweden’s geography, and Hitler’s military 
priorities.
Supporters of the balance of power theory, claim that the power balance was . 
upset when the Soviet Union signed the non-aggression treaty with Nazi Germany.
Once the power balance was disturbed, the countries which lay between the power 
blocks became most vulnerable. Thus, Russia attacked Finland because It needed 
a buffer zone to protect it from a possible war with Germany. Similarly, Norway 
and Denmark were attacked by Germany because they were situated between the two 
largest power blocks: the German and British. Sweden was lucky enough not to 
lie in an area which was needed to maintain the balance of power. If, for example, 
Britain had attacked Norway and Denmark, then Germany would have been forced to 
attack Sweden in order to protect itself from Britain and thus maintain the power 
balance.^
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A problem with the balance of power theory 1s that it over-estimates military 
factors in keeping Sweden out of the war. Although an unbalance of power could 
have caused an invasion, it 1$ very likely that political and economic factors 
also could have brought about an attack. Since Germany was rather dependent on 
Swedish iron ore and ball bearing imports, a decision to cut off this trade could
34
have likely led to a German Invasion, regardless of how "balanced" the powers were.
Sweden's geography made it a less appealing target than the other Scandinavian
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countries. It is much larger than them in both land and population. More im­
portant than its size was its geographic location. Both Norway and Denmark pro­
vided a buffer zone between England and Germany, making them useful as launching 
pads for attacking Britain. In contrast, Sweden could not be used as a launching 
pad against any of the great powers. Even though Sweden's geography may have acted 
as a disincentive to Hitler, It certainly would have not have been a strong enough 
one to prevent an attack, since the Soviet Union Is certainly larger than Sweden 
in both land and population.
A more important factor which helped keep Sweden out of the war was Hitler's 
military priorities. France, Poland and Russia were all more populous than Sweden, 
but were attacked because they were higher priorities for Germany, even though 
they brought higher costs than an Invasion of Sweden. As Gunner HagglBf put It, 
Sweden wasn't attacked due to "the simple fact that Hitler had other plans to 
p u r s u e . H e  argues that when Hitler attacked Norway and Denmark, he also had 
plans to attack France, and too many military units would delay 1t.^ After the 
Norwegian and Danish invasions April 9, 1940, the next big war scare for Sweden 
occurred in February, 1942. During that month, rumors of a pending German In- 
vasion began floating. Erik Boheman, who was then Secretary-General of the 
Swedish Foreign Ministry, believes that Hitler decided against an attack because 
it would take away too many soldiers from the spring offensive against Russia.^
Even if other military engagements were not the deciding factor in keeping Hitler
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from attacking Sweden, there is little doubt that the country would have even­
tually faced the ultimatum of joining the Nazi's New Order or being invaded if 
Germany had won the war.
MILITARY EXPLANATIONS
A Swedish invasion would have been more costly for Hitler than the invasions
of either Denmark or Norway, because the former had a much stronger defense system
than the letters.*** When Norway and Denmark were attacked, Sweden had already
mobilized around 90,000 soldiers. A few weeks later, more than 320,000 men*were 
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under arms. As rumors spread of a German attack in February, 1942, the armed 
forces quickly increased their totals from approximately 160,000 in the previous 
month to nearly 260,000. (See the graph below).
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Even though there Is little doubt that Sweden could not hold out more than a few 
months at most against a German attack, many observors feel It was long enough to 
dlsuade Hitler from Invading since the drain on manpower would slow down his 
operations elsewhere. Again, If Sweden were a higher military priority. It 
still would have been attacked, despite Its military strength, since It was much
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weaker than other countries which Germany Invaded.
Not everyone Is In agreement that Sweden was able to mobilize sufficiently
enough to act as a deterent. Bengt Ahslund writes, "That (Sweden's) military
preparedness was Insufficient In the presence of the threat which Sweden faced
during the Second World War's beginning, and during Its first year, Is beyond
any doubt."44 General Olof ThSrnell, who was Commander-In-Chief of the Swedish
Armed Forces during World War II, has also claimed that the rearmament program
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which began In 1936 was “unsatisfactory."
Despite warnings of a possible German attack In Scandinavia which reached
Sweden as early as March, 1940, Foreign Minister Christian Gunther convinced the
government to turn down Thornell's request for Increased southern mobilization,
46
because he still did not believe that an attack was likely. Boheman argues,
at the time of the German attacks on Norway and Denmark, Sweden was actually
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weaker militarily than at the beginning of the war. Captain Chrlster Wahlgren
claims that when the Invasion began on April 9, 1940, almost no troops had been
assembled in Southern Sweden - which was a short boat ride away from the German
occupied Copenhagen. Even after the rapid mobilization occurred 1n April and
May, GUnther gave a “defeatest" talk at a June cabinet meeting while discussing
Sweden's possibility of defending Itself against Germany. At the same meeting,
Gustaf Andersson 1 Rasjon, who was then the Liberal Party's leader as well as
Communication Minister, actually favored demobilization so that Swedes would not
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become tired of being mobilized and hence loose the will to defend themselves.
SO
The following month, the armed forces were reduced by over 120,000 men.
Even if Sweden had fully mobilized Itself, that alone could not have pre­
vented a German attack. Former Norwegian Foreign Minister Trygve lie, admits 
that If he had known of the pending German offensive, he would have increased his 
country's military preparedness. Yet he feels that Hitler would have attacked 
anyway# Furthermorei he notes that Holland's mobilization of approximately
400•000 soldiers didn't prevent a Nazi Invasion.
Lie shows that a greater military mobilization could not in itself have pre­
vented a Nazi invasion. Still, in Sweden's case, the country's ability to defend 
itself might have been a greater disensentive for Hitler than it could have been in 
Norway, because Norway was of greater strategic importance than Sweden. Norway 
could be used to launch attacks on England. In addition, Norway's capture enabled 
Germany to have greater control over the North Sea. The Norwegian shipping town, 
Narvik, was also of great importance, enabling Germany to secure its iron ore 
imports from Sweden. Sweden was only of strategic value because of its iron ore 
and ball bearing exports, which Germany was able to acquire without military 
action. (See the discussion below of the importance of Swedish exports to Germany 
in keeping Sweden out of the war.) Since Sweden did not have the strategic value 
of Norway, Hitler was less interested in invading it. So, if Sweden were able to 
put up a resonable amount of opposition, it may have been enough to disuade Hitler 
from attacking. Similarly, if Sweden's defenses had been as weak as Norway's,
Hitler might have considered an invasion worth the trouble in order to be assured 
of Swedish exports. The only thing that can be concluded for certain is that 
despite the fact that Sweden was stronger militarily than either Denmark or Norway, 
this alone cannot explain why SweJen was not attacked while the others were.
ECONOMIC FACTORS
Roderick Ogley theorizes that if a belligerent country is dependent on a 
neutral country's resources, but its enemies are not, then that belligerent 
country is not likely to invade the neutral country if the resources can be ob- 
talned through trade. Germany and Sweden found themselves In this situation 
during the war. Germany was dependent on Swedish iron ore and was able to trade 
for it. Meanwhile! none of the Allied Powers Imported a major share of its iron 
ore from Sweden before the war and. after Denmark and Norway were invaded! virtually
51
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all of Sweden's exports f# the west were cut off.
In this situation, Germany had a lot to lose by attacking Sweden and little
Ci
to gain - at least in the economic sphere. fiunnar Wlgglff, who was head of the 
cosmerc ial department of the Swedish Foreign Ministry from 1939-1941, werned 
Gemma delegations on several occasions that even if the iron ore mines were not 
quickly destroyed, their power stations could be blown up in a matter of moments.
In addition, once Sweden fell under Axis control, it would be subjected to an Allied
* jr
blockade which would threaten German supplies. Since the Allied Powers weren't
dependent on Swedish trade, they wouldn't be hurt by a German occupation of Sweden.
The only advantages Germany could have received from an invasion would be in the
military sphere. Of course the military sphere is a very important one, and if
Hitler felt military considerations warranted it, he undoubtedly would have attack-
57
ed Sweden in spite of the economic consequences.
POLITICAL FACTORS
Using a fairly broad definition of the political sphere, one can come up with 
five reasons which are most commonly given for Sweden's success in avoiding war.
They are: 1) the country's political unity, 2) Sweden's ability to convince Germany 
that it would defend itself against a British attack, 3) Sweden's skillful diplomacy, 
4) the government's mass media policy, and 5) the personal and cultural ties be­
tween the two countries.
Policital Unity
Shortly after the Soviet invasion of Finland, the Social Democratic Prime 
Minister, Per Albin Mansson, formed a coalition government with all the parties in 
parliament represented except the Communists. The basic idea behind the coalition 
was th# old notion that unity gluts strength.58 with a national consensus reached, 
th* government could be assured the populace would support Its policy. Unlike 
Norway, thora was no organized opposition of any significance which could be used
• H *
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by the Nazis to divide public opinion and thus weafcon Sweden's willingness to de­
fend itself.59
Defense Against the British
According It Oglty, a ntutral country must convince the belligerents that It 
will defen# Itself from attacks an# encroachment* from the opposing belligerents 
if It wants to remain outsidt a power conflict.®® Ofley's theory appears most 
convincing In Sweden’s case in regards to the country's relationship to Nail 
Germany. Hitler had good reason to fear that Britain would launch an invasion or 
at least a blockade against Sweden to prevent iron ore exports to Germany.®^ In 
order to alleviate German fears, Admiral Fabian Tramti visited Berlin several days 
after the Norwegten/Danish Invasions in order to convince Hitler that- Sweden would 
defend Itself against a British attack. Despite Swedish assurances, the Germans 
were still doubtful of Sweden’s attitude toward Britain. Xke Uhlin points out 
that Sweden's envoy to Germany, Arvid Richard, wrote to the Swedish Foreign Hinistry 
in August, 1941 warning of German fears that Swedish troops would connect with 
British troops in a Norwegian landing. According to Richard, German mistrust could 
lead to “military action.’’®3 Even during the so-called "February Crisis" of 1942 
in which rumors of a German attack made mobilitation necessary, Sweden assured
64
Germany that the mobilization occurred 1n order to meet possible British actions. 
This last example can be Interpreted as merely an example of Sweden's fearfulness 
of Germany, but Is also shows that Sweden consistently emphasized Its willingness 
to defend Itself against Britain and that this emphasis played a central role 1n 
the country's German relationship.
SMIlful Diplomacy
Andren argues that 1n order for • neutral country to avoid war, its neutrality 
must be believable.65 As argued above, it was especially Important during World 
War Two for Germany to be convinced that Sweden would remain neutral even In face
of a British attack, The fact that Sweden had been neutral for so many years also
added to its credibility. Mot only did it add to Sweden’s credibility, it also gave
the country a lot of practical experience with neutral politics. According to
several authors, Sweden's practical experiences along with its well informed and
skillful diplomacy contributed to the country's ability to prevent a German attack,^
Martin Fritz gives an interesting example of Sweden's diplomatic skills in one
67
of his studies on Sweden's trade with Nazi Germany. He uncovered documents
which show that when Sweden denied Germany's requests to send weapons and troops to
Norway through Sweden, the Nazis responded by cutting off war material exports.
Sweden countered that they wouldn't be able to defend themselves against a British 
68
attack. Of course trw continuation of war material trade Increased Sweden's 
ability to defend itself against Germany, while at the same time improving the two 
countries’ diplomatic relationships.
Another example of Sweden's diplomatic skill was its ability to conceal Allied
influence on its German trade and transit policies. After Sweden agreed to Allied
demands of discontinuing German military transits through Sweden to Norway, as well
as giving assurances that German trade levels would be lowered, Foreign Minister
Gunther presented Sweden's position to the Nazis in the summer of 1943 as being in
69
his country's own Interests. No mention of the Allied demands were made. Instead, 
he gave the adverse effects that Germany's occupation of Norway had on both Norwegian* 
Swedish relationships and on German-S\ dish relationships as the main reasons for 
Sweden's decisions. By avoiding any mention of Allied demands. Sweden was able to 
avoid Nazi reprisals for following the Western Powers' wishes. Nevertheless, even 
In this case. Hitler's reaction might have been different If he weren't preoccupied 
with Mussolini's fall. It Is therefore doubtful that Sweden's diplomatic skill 
alone could have prevented a Nazi attack.
Mass Media Policy
The Swedish government's attempts to Influence the mass media during the war
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hav° often been heavily criticized.70 Regardless of this policy's "rightness" or 
"wrongness*" many observers think that a certain amount of censorship was needed if 
a Nazi Invasion was to be avoided. Former Svenska Dagbladet newspaper reporter,
Ivar Anderson, reports that Gunther was aware of the fact that Hitler was abnorm­
ally sensitive to his prestige and that since he had absolute power, he could be 
provoked by an anti-Nazi press campaign.7  ^ The Swedish Ministry in Berlin was 
told that Hitler had been kept informed of anti-German articles in the Swedish 
press7  ^and during the two month period, July - August 1940, 25 protests were made 
against Swedish radio and press reports.7"* Another example of the importance Hitler 
placed on press coverage concerns the February Crisis. On February 5, 1942, the 
German legations's counselor named the Swedish press' position on Hitler's Cast 
campaign as one of the main reasons for the deterioration of German-Swedish re­
lations.7* Whether or not an untamed Swedish press would have caused Hitler to 
attack cannot be known; it is known that negative press reportage upset Hitler and 
consequently affected his attitude toward Sweden.
Personal, and Cultural Ties
Sweden has had cultural ties with Germany which may have given Nazi leaders 
a more favorable disposition toward the country. Swedish is a Germanic language 
and until the Second World War ended, German was the first foreign language taught 
1h Swedish schools.75 German culture was the dominating influence on Swedish 
culture before the war, especially on the upper-classes. Similarly, Germany was not 
without Swedish influences. Sweden occupied a good portion of Germany during the 
reign of Gustav II in the 1600's. In addition, the writings of such authors as 
Selma tagerlHf were glorified by Nazi propagandists trying to portray them as good 
"aryao" writers.7* One might even assume that Hitler admired Sweden's supposed 
homogeneity (i.e. race purity).
Even though Norway and Denmark also share a Germanic heritage, it wa 
Gustav II and Karl X U  country which Interested the Nordic oriented Germar
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Thulstrup argues that this phenomenon can partially be explained by the fact that 
Sweden had not had conflicts In recent times with Germany. In contrast, Denmark 
had aroused the anger of German nationalists after receiving land from Germany in
f l
a referendum held in accordance with the Versailles Treaty, Unfortunately, 
Thulstrup does not discuss why the Nordic-oriented Germany liked Sweden more than 
Norway.
Despite the cultural interest some Germans had for Sweden, it is doubtful that
they had much influence in shaping Nazi foreign policy. A former Hitler associate
wrote of Hitler's attitude toward Sweden; "What interested Hitler in Scandinavia
in every case was not the pure Aryan blood, not the Nordic myth of Viking temper-
ment and hero inclination (hjaltesinne). What interested him was iron ore.
Personal ties between Swedes and Germans probably played a greater role in
determining Nazi policy than cultural ties did. The most famous example of a Nazi
hiving personal ties to Sweden is Herman Gb’ring's marriage to a Swedish woman,
Carin Took. Not only did Goring have relatives in Sweden, he could also speak
Swedish. It is unclear to what extent Wring's Swedish sympathies affected Nazi
policy. For example, Sweden's Minister in Berlin, Arvid Bichert* attributed
Goring's "benevolence" as one of the main reasons for the stabilization of Swedish-
German relations a few weeks after the Danish/Norwegian Invasions. Still, GBring
81was often very critical of Swedish policy and it is doubtful that he would have 
let his Swedish sympathies get in the way of his ambitions for the Third Reich.
GSring isn‘t the only Nazi known to have Swedish sympathies - even Hitler is 
thought to have been sympathetic to Sweden. Prime Minister Mansion received a re­
port from Berlin on a speech by Hitler in which he showed himself positively dis-
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posed toward Hansson. According to the report. Hitler had a weakness for people 
from the working class who became "folk leaders," even if they chose a different 
path than himself.
If Hitler's sympathies for Sweden affected his foreign policy, it is more
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likely his sympathies for the king than for the prime minister which influenced 
him. King Gustaf V1! wife was German and Hitler probably thought that the king 
would use his influence to keep Sweden's policy friendly toward Germany. As the 
German plenipotentiary Karl Schnurre once said to Sweden's Commander-in-Chief 01 of 
ThSfnelli "We can trust the king but not your politicians."®® The king took ad­
vantage of his standing in Germany by giving his personal guarantee of Sweden's 
neutrality after the German invasion of Norway and Denmark.®* Similarly, one and 
a half years later* the king gave his "warm thanks to the Ftlhrer," for his decision
DC
to wipe out “the Bolshevek epidemic." Gustav V may have been Sweden's most 
respected personality in Nazi Germany, but it is unlikely that this respect was 
placed higher than the Nazis' respect for iron ore, not to mention their desire to 
place Sweden under the New Order.
SUMMARY
All of the above mentioned factors probably contributed to Sweden's ability 
to remain outside of the war. It is clear, however, that certain factors contributed 
more than others. In the long run, it was circumstances outside of Sweden's control 
which prevented a Nazi invasion. If Hitler had won the war, a Swedish occupation 
would have almost certainly followed. The Norwegian and Danish invasions, along 
with repeated Nazi demands which encroached upon Sweden's neutrality (such as 
military transits through Sweden to Norway and Finland), show tnat Hitler had little 
respect for declarations of neutrality. Even though the cii^umstances which saved 
Sweden from war in the long-run were outside of the country's control, many circle** 
stances in the short-run were inside of Sweden's control. Although Sweden was not 
considered strategically important in the short-run, Germany's priorities could 
have quickly changed if Sweden decided to cut-off iron ore exports or if Sweden 
had refused to allow troop transports through its territory.
PART I I
FOUR CASE STUDIES
In regards to Sweden's foreign policy toward Nazi Germany, four subjects are 
often considered most controversial. One is the sale of Iron ore and ball bearings 
to Germany, which the Nazi's used for its military industry. Another is the trans­
port agreements which allowed the Nazi's to send troops through Sweden both to and 
from Norway. A third is the permission given to Germany to send 15,000 troops 
through Sweden to Finland, in preparation for the Axis invasion of the Soviet 
Union. A fourth is the Nazi attempt to influence Sweden's internal politics, In­
cluding Sweden's censorship policy, a Communist Party ban, and the internship of 
Cornminists. Since each of these subjects are central to understanding German- 
Swedish relations during World War II, they will be treated in detail as in­
dividual case studies.
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CHAPTER 4
CASE 1:
IRON ORE AND BALL BEARING EXPORTS
Perhaps no aspect of Sweden's foreign policy was more harshly criticized by 
the Allies than its trade with Nazi Germany. The allies charged that Sweden's 
iron ore and ball bearing exports were of great importance to the Nazi military 
machine. In order to explain the context in which this trade occurredt Sweden's 
trade dependence on Germany will be examined, as well as the possible Nazi re­
actions to a cut-off in trade and Germany's dependence on Swedish trade. After 
examining the context in which the trade occurred, Sweden's trade policy will be 
analyzed.
DEPENDENCE ON GERMANY
When Germany Invaded Norway and Denmark on April 9, 1940, it laid minefields
in the northern tip of Denmark and the southern tip of Norway. According to
economic historlal Martin Fritz, "Sweden's foreign trade was thus at a stroke
denied access to the West, whither 70% of its trade had previously been orlen- 
86
tated. Sweden became almost completely dependent on Germany for Its Imports
of coke and coal, steel products, chemical products, oil, machinery and instru- 
87
ments. Sweden was particularly dependent on Germany for fuel Imports. Economic 
Historian Sven-Olof Olsson writes that during most of the war, "Sweden had to rely 
on German goodwill for its Imports of fuel."88
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GRAPH 2
OQ
Germany's Share of Swedish Trade
Gunnar HSggISf claims that Sweden tried to offset Its dependence on Germany 
by Increasing trade with the Soviet Union, but 1t was not believable that the 
Soviets could deliver a "meaningful" amount of goods. 1“ Sweden did, however, 
work out a 100 million crown trade deal with Russia on September 7, 1940.91
GERMAN REACTIONS TO IRON ORE CUT-OFFS
It 1s Impossible to know exactly how Germany would have reacted If Sweden 
had cut-off all Its Iron ore exports. The answer depends In part on when the 
cancellations would have taken place. For example, 1n the second half of 1944, 
when Germany's defeat was already assured, Sweden was able to reduce Its exports
Q9
drastically without suffering a Nazi retaliation. If Sweden had made the same
reductions at the beginning of the war, it is unlikely that the Nazis would have
given such a benevolent response. At the very least* Sweden could have expected
a discontinuation of German coal, coke and chemical deliveries. This was made
clear when a German War Conrnission announced on September 7f 1939 that a delay in
93
delivering iron ore would hurt Sweden’s chances of receiving German exports. It 
is extremely likely that an early cancellation of iron ore exports could have led 
to a German invasion. As early as 1937» Goring warned that Germany had four-year
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plans to fulfill which counted on continuance of the iron ore deliveries, and 
therefore the iron ore would be secured at “all costs.tt^  Further evidence of the
importance that Germany placed on the iron ore deliveries can be seen in a 
document which was uncovered by a Danish parliament’s investigatory commission. 
The document shows that the Nazis had originally planned to occupy both the im­
portant iron ore exporting town of luleS and the railway leading from Lulel to 
Narvik (the other important shipping town in which Germany received most of its
iron ore exports from.) In addition, the document shows the planned occupation 
of the northern iron ore mine fields. (See below for a reproduction of the 
document.)
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(Sweden was stricken off the occupation plans on March 1, 1940).
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GERMAN DEPENDENCE ON SWEDEN
Friti's survey on Germany's reliance on Swedish iron ore exports shows that 
Germany was much more dependent in the war's beginning than it was even a year 
* later. (See the graph below)
GRAPH 3
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Once the war broke out, most of Germany's imports were stopped. Total supplies 
were cut by one-third, so Sweden became an extremely important source of Imports.^ 
With the surrender of France, Germany was able to count on a steady supply of 
iron ore from the French mines, so the importance of Swedish exports was sharply
reduced. Friti concludes: "We can therefore say that an acute shortage of ore
QO
never constituted a bottleneck In German steel production."
Fritz goes on to show that the Importance of Swedish Imports cannot be de­
termined merely by looking at their quantity. It was their Quality that made them
so valuable to Germany. : edlsh ore had approximately a 60% iron content compared 
to Germany's 30*.99 In addition. Germany needed 1ow-pho$poras ores for Its arms 
Industry which could only be Imported. As the war progressed, low-phosporas ores 
comprised an Increasingly larger share of Swedish ore exports. 99
-2 7 -
The value of Swedish ore exports cannot be simply measured In terms of the 
direct effects of their quantity and quality; indirect factors must also be 
measured. Fritz discusses three important ways in which the ore imports con­
tributed to the German economy.^ First of all. the country suffered from an 
acute labor shortage, so Swedish imports freed German workers for other Jobs. 
Secondly, the imports freed German train traffic. Fritz estimates that in 1937 
around 20 of German railway traffic was used for the steel industry. Since 
Swedish imports were transported mostly by boat, they didn't require as much rail­
way usage. Finally, Swedish ore was much cheaper than that produced domestically. 
Consequently, even if Germany could have produced enough domestic iron ore along 
with its French imports to make up for a loss in Swedish imports, it would have 
damaged the German economy.
Even though Sweden was also highly criticized for its ball bearing exports,
Fritz argues that they weren't nearly as significant as the ore exports. It is
correct that Sweden was Germany's largest supplier of ball bearings. In fact, in
1943, 701 of Germany's ball bearing imports came from Sweden, Yet even in g%V»
peak year, Swedish exports amounted to less then lot of Germany's tQtil tvppVy.^
Bohenwn claims that the quantity of the ball nearing exports to Germany were not
103
large enough to be meaningful for their military.
TRADE ANALYSIS
Those who defend Sweden's trade policy claim that the country was forced to 
trade heavily with Germany in the beginning of the war *hen it was surrounded by 
Germany and cut-off from its trade routes. Once Germany's fortunes changed and 
the Nazi weren't able to excert as much pressure, Sweden was able to cut back 
sharply Its German trade.
Fritz describes Sweden's foreign policy as follows:
104
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Sweden’s foreign policy during these years may be regarded 
as a balancing act between the interests of the belligerent 
blocks and the direct demands upon neutral Sweden that could 
be dictated by the interplay of power politics. (Therefore,
Sweden) had to make significant concessions to German inter­
ests and desires during the first half of the war...By the 
same token, the Swedish attitude towards Germany became less 
compliant after the military balance had shifted in favour 
of the western powers.
Even though Fritz writes this about Sweden's foreign policy in general, he 
implies that the same is true of Sweden's trade policy in particular.
Hiigglbf, who was Sweden's chief trade negotiator during the war, supports 
Fritz's theory in his book, Svensk krigshandels politik under anca varldskriget. 
He claims that at the war's out-break, Sweden had a "vital need" to import from 
Germany. ***^  German coal, coke, commercial iron, chemicals and fertilizer were 
especially needed. Of course, in order to import, the country had to export. 
Despite the tough position in which Sweden found Itself, it tried to limit U s  
ore exports to Germany. While German negotiators demanded that ore exports be 
kept at the previous year's (1938) levels, Swedish negotiators insisted on hold­
ing the level of exports to the average yearly level from 1933 to 1938.*06 This 
implied a decrease of 3 million tons (from 10 to 7 million). The Germans became 
so angered that they refused to continue negotiations.**** Sweden gave in to
German demands after much pressure, and on December 22, 1939, both sides agreed
108
at the original 10 million ton level.
During the following year, Sweden's trade position strongly deteriorated.
Before the German occupation of Norway and Denmark, Sweden could attempt to play
off Britain against Germany in the hope of receiving the most favorable trade
109
terms from each country. Once Sweden became isolated by Germany, without any 
possibility of exporting to the West, the former had to pursue a more positive 
trade policy with the latter. In fact, Sweden faced great German pressure to 
join the New Order.****
German pressure increased, and in 1941, Sweden gave in to demands to grant
Germany export credits of up to 30£ for certain products.111 Granting the credits 
obviously put Sweden at a trade disadvantage! since it implied that Sweden hid to 
give up more pods than it received. Nevertheless, Sweden was able to minimite 
its losses by procuring the delivery of 10.5cm howitzers which beefed up its 
defenses. In addition, no credits were given on Sweden's most important export 
product - iron ore.
In spite of the unfavorable trade terms which Sweden was forced to accept,
112
the German weapons deliveries greatly helped the country's military build-up.
In turn, the following year when Sweden had achieved a stonger military build-up 
and Germany's military situation had worsened, Sweden found itself in a much 
stronger bargaining position. Confident that Sweden could cut off its credits 
to Germany without risking reprisals, Haggldf announced on Oecember 15, 1942 
that the Swedish Government had to hold back foreign credits in order to "fight 
Inflation."113
As Germany's continental dominance continued to decline, Sweden took an
increasingly hard line in its negotiations. In the beginning of 1944, Sweden
decided to lower ore exports to 7.5 million tons - a decline of 2.5 million tons.11*
Furthermore, all boat exports to Germany were discontinued. During June, ore
deliveries were reduced by 40' and on September 27, the government decided to
11S
close all harbors In the Baltic Sea. By the end of 1944, when Germany's 
defeat had been Assured, Hagglcf reports that all trade with the country had 
ended. 116
The defenders of Sweden's trade policy are correct in claiming that the 
amount of exports corresponded to Germany's military strength; however, 1t is 
questionable as to whether Sweden had any desire to lower its ore exports. On 
the contrary, one could argue that Sweden tried to export as much as possible to 
Germany, and the decreases during the war's later years were caused by Allied 
pressure rather than a moralistic wish to help fascism's defeat.
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Evidence of Sweden*s desire to export a large ^tlty of ore can be seen 
1n a speech Foreign Minister Gunther gave nearly one month before the Danish 
and Norwegian invasions. He argued against lowering ore exports because it 
would not be consistent with Sweden's neutralism.^7 If this was Sweden's 
attitude before its Western trade routes were closed, it was obvious Sweden 
would have no intention of limiting ore exports afterwards.
The abov* example can simply be taken as a case of Sweden following a real­
istic strategy. After all, a meaningful reduction in ore exports could provoke 
German military action. Moreover, German imports acquired from these exports were 
necessary in order for Sweden to build up its defense. A look at the extra­
ordinary measures Sweden took in order to maintain high ore exports, though, 
challenges the "realistic strategy" defense. For example, the Swedisii navy 
actually helped with the German ore deliveries. Even Fritz admits that the 
help was "to an extent which went far beyond the framework of the (ore export) 
agreement."^8
Sweden's determination to keep ore exports at a high level continued even 
after Allied pressure near the end of the war forced Sweden to lower its ex­
ports. So, although an agreement was reached with Great Britain and the United 
States to decrease ore exports 1n 1944 to 7.5 million tons, Sweden secretly in­
creased the Quality of its export
Fritz describes German-Swedlsh trade relations - after the decision to
110
lower ore exports - in the following manner:' ’
The German negotiators protested, of course, and to comply 
with German wishes and also because the Swedish side con­
sidered it desirable to continue a large-scale trade with 
Germany, deliveries of low-phosphorous ores suitable for 
armaments were increased - which could be done easily since 
the Allies had no idea of the significance of the different 
grades of ore.
According to Fritz, Sweden did not even want to comply with its ore export 
agreement it had made with the Allies. He writes that^8
Sweden certainly endeavoured formally to comply but at the 
same time in fact employed a variety of expedients, most of 
them hidden to view and not susceptible to control on the 
part of the Allies, in order to maintain its trade with 
Germany at as high a level as possible.
These last two quotations by Fritz seem to contradict his statement that 
“the Swedish attitude towards Germany became less compliant after the military 
balance had shifted in favour of the western powers." (See page 25, footnote 
95.) It is probable that the decrease in Swedish exports to Germany at the end 
of the war was more dependent upon increased Allied pressure than on a Swedish 
attitude change. Furthermore, even though Sweden would have faced severe con­
sequences if it failed to export ore in the beginning of the war, the same would 
not have been true if the country failed to increase the ore’s quality in 1944. 
It is also doubtful that Germany would have reacted strongly if Sweden had not 
used its navy to help in the exports.
It can be concluded that Swedish trade policy was not aimed at keeping 
German trade to a minimum. Actions such as giving navy escorts to German ships 
and increasing the quality of ore shipments af cer Germany’s defeat had become 
a certainty, show Sweden's determination lo keep its trade at as high a level as 
possible. Sweden was probably not Motivated by a desire to help Germany, but 
rather by its dependence on German imports. Since almost all of Sweden’s im­
ports during the war came from Germany, it wanted favorable trade relations 
with the Axis power.
CHAPTER 5
CASE 2:
GERMAN TRANSPORTS TO NORWAY
It is not in accordance with strict neutrality to allow a 
warring nation to utilize Swedish territory for its attack.,.. 
If such a demand is made, it must be denied.
(Radio speech by Prime Minister Hansson, on 12 April 
1940, >ee footnote 121.)
...Sweden's declared neutrality makes it impossible to 
allow the passage of troops or transports of war material 
of any kind to any of the warring nations.
(Swedish Foreign Ministry press release from 22 April 
1940, see footnote 122.)
Despite the official proclamations against allowing the use of Swedish 
territory to carry out military transfers, the Swedish government yielded a few 
months later to German demands which clearly contradicted them. From the summer 
of 1940 to the summer of 1943, Germany was allowed to transfer a limited number of 
soldiers through Sweden - both to and from Norway. The transfers will be ex­
amined by dividing them into three different time periods: 1) the first de­
mands and agreements in spring/summer 1940; 2) the March Crisis in 1941; and 3) 
their termination in summer 1943.
the first t g m m
Sheriff after the war broke out in Norway, Germany demanded to be allowed
123
to tfifafftrl military suppi its through Sweden to Norway. It even offered to 
send Sweden weapon, in touthtrn Sweden if Sweden sent the Germans Swedish weapons 
in Norway. Da,pits Wring’, warnings, j««den refused to allow weapons transports. 
Germany was so intent ,n tending weapons through Sweden that they attempted to 
smuggle them if! through the German Red Cross. In spite of the consistent press-
ure, Sweden only agreed to transport civilian goods which were on a scale con*
sistent with normal peace time requirements. Ivar Anderson reports that 40
124
nurses were also permitted to travel to Norway. In addition, 600 "shipwrecked* 
(skeppbrutna) sailors and 150 Injured soldiers were allowed to return to Germany. 
The following month German pressure Increased. On Hay 13, Germany requested
the use of 3 trains carrying between 30-40 sealed cars containing military equip*
125
ment for transport to Norway. Both Prime Minister Hansson and Conservative 
Party leader GSsta Bagge opposed the request, but Foreign Minister Gilnther was 
doubtful and said that 1t would be hard for him to take the responsibility that 
a “no" implies.126
Six days later a new request was made. This time the Germans wanted 100 
railway cars for military transport to Norway. Richert, who was then Sweden's 
envoy to Germany, warned that he felt that it was a question of prestige for 
Hitler. H1s admonition went unheeded, however, and the cabinet voted unanimously 
against granting the requests.
Once Norway capitulated, Sweden faced new demands. German Foreign Minister 
Joachim von Ribbentrop argued that since the fighting had ended, Sweden would not 
be helping one belligerent against another. Therefore, Sweden had no excuse not 
to allow transports. Furthermore, a refusal would have been seen as an un­
friendly actJ*®
Sweden found itself in a very difficult situation. The risks of a German 
attack were considered very high 1f the requests were denied. Richert felt that 
it was necessary to allow transit traffic if Sweden were to avoid an invasion. 
Moreover, government officials remembered Hitler's warning from two months pre­
viously, in which he reminded a Swedish delegation that he had crushed two
130
countries already and would do the same to any country which stood in his way.
To make matters worse, word had just come in from Britain that France was about to 
surrender.131 Thus, England was to be the only European country actively resist-
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iog the Nazis. Yet even Britain's resistance could no longer be counted on. 
Britain's Under-Secretary of State, Richard Austin Buttler, hinted that h1s 
country would negotiate a peace treaty with Hitler. He is reported to have said, 
“Common sense* not bravado would dictate the British government1* policy/1
Since Germany dominated the continent and Sweden could not count on any 
outside help if attacked, the country was hardly in a position to display bold­
ness. In fact, some prominent officials, such as Gunther, favored forming a
closer relationship with Germany, in order to strengthen Sweden's position in
133
Scandinavia, especially in regard to the USSR. The Soviet Union was still 
feared by many conservatives because of its invasion of Finland and it was be­
lieved that a better relationship with Germany would at least protect Sweden from 
the Eastern threat.
The Hpro-German" line did not prevail, nevertheless, the government did 
decide that concessions would have to be made and Gunther was given the task of 
negotiating with the aim of giving up as little as possible. After the decision 
was made, Hansson wrote in his journal that “thus we broke our dear and strictly 
held neutralism because of our knowledge that it would be unreasonable in the 
current situation to take the risk of having a war.'"''’
Gunther succeeded In limiting the concessions. Originally, the Germans 
wanted to have the railroads at their disposal. The final agreement on July 8 
had five main points according to Carlgren. 1) Transports would be limited 
to what Is "technically feasible." Presumably, Carlgren means that no trains 
would be taken off their normal routes and therefore Swedish passengers would not 
have to make any sacrifices. 2) The soldiers must travel without any weapons.
3) Single travelers must give prior notice. 4) The transports cannot be used 
to send reinforcements to Norway. Instead, the number of soldiers entering 
Norway must always equal the number leaving. Although Carlgren does not mention 
It, the transports were also supposed to be limited to "permit" transports, 1e.
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soldiers going to Germany In order to receive medical treatment or take a vaca­
tion, and soldiers returning after doing so. * 5) A limited number of troops 
can be transferred between Trondheim and Narvik (both located in Norway) through 
Swedish territory. Krister Wahl back reports that the agreed number of permit
transfers was to be 500 per day plus an additional 55 per week from Narvik to
1 3 7
Trelleborg (the port city in Southern Sweden.)
After the July 8 agreement, Sweden received occasional requests for extra
1 3 S
single transits. Carlgren admits that such requests were usually accommodated.
An SS battalion was even given permission to travel through Sweden. Not all re­
quests were granted, however; and during October, Sweden refused a request to 
transfer 15,000 troops to Norway. Carlgren estimates that 360,000 German soldiers 
traveled thrcugh Sweden during 1940.
THE MARCH 1941 CRISIS
In the beginning of (torch, 1941, a discrepancy was found between the number
of soldiers entering and !< ^ n g  Norway. Germany had been obviously using the
transports during late debt ^  / and early (torch in order to mobiliie troops for
an upcoming attack on the USSR. German officials gave insurances that this trend
1)0
would only continue to (torch 10. They claimed that ice problems made it hard 
to transfer soldiers by boat and that there would be no more need to use the rail­
way once the sea had cleared up.
Once the deadline expired, the Germans quickly changed their tone. Suddenly 
they demanded permission to send 76,000 troops through Sweden from (torch 10 to 
March 29.140 Gunther knew that such a large number would not be acceptable to 
the Swedish government. At the same time, he knew that the Germans were deter­
mined to send the troops in preparation for an invasion of the Soviet Union. He 
solved the problem by agreeing to the transport of 15,000 troops by railroad while 
the remaining could be sent by ship through Sweden's territorial waters.141
Gunther favored sea over land transfers because they would be harder to observe 
and would not imply as strong an encroachment on neutralism as land transfers
On March 20, an additional concession was made: Germany was allowed to 
transport artillery to Norway.^ It was told by the Swedish Foreign Ministry to 
make the transfer at night so that it could be kept secret. Leif Bjttrkman claims 
that Gunther favored the artillery transport for tactical reasons: Germany had 
announced that new negotiations on the transit agreements would be opened, so it 
would be better if they had a favorable attitude toward Sweden during the negot* 
iations.*44 Immediately after March 29, the number of troops transported through 
Sweden to Norway went back to previous levels, and during April, there was only a 
surplus of 2,000 German troops entering Norway. (See Table 2).
GRAPH 4:
THE NUMBER OF GERMAN SOLDIERS 
TRANSFERRED THROUGH SHIDEN IN 
HARCH 1941145
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(During March, 1941, a total of 
27,783 soldiers came to Norway 
via Swedeg.while 6,817 left 
Norway).'*6
TRANSIT TERMINATION
As the Allies became more successful, they began to exert pressure on Sweden
to cancel the transit agreement with Germany. During the trade negotiations in
London during May and June 1n 1943, they threatened to annul the agreements if
1 4 7
the transfer traffic was not terminated by October 1. Even though the German
TABLE 2:
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blockade had kept Allied trade at a low level, Sweden was aware that trade with the
West could once again become Important since it was apparent that Germany would
lose the war. Consequently, Sweden desired good trade relations with the West.
On July 29, the Allies1 wish was granted as fSinther announced thet the frpisit
lagwould not continue. Around one week later, the German r->nntiat®r\-Karl 
Schnurr , signed an agreement stipulating that the traffic would cease within the 
m o nth.^
Since the decision to discontinue the permit traffic was made in connection
with the Allied trade agreements, it is tempting to conclude that Allied pressure
was Sweden’s main motive behind the decision. Rune Karlssor, in his study on the
transit traffic, concludes that this hypothesis is correct, but he points out
that growing opposition displayed in mass meetings along with the growing par-
151liamentary opposition also motivated the cancellation decision.
Finally, it should be mentioned that despite the train transfer cancellation,
Germany continued to send troops over Sweden with airplanes. Lars Kranti points
152
out that these ’courier flights” continued until September, 1944.
o m m  %
CASE 3:
t&mn T«*fiSf>o*Ts to Finland
While the iron ore sales to Germany ma# have been Sweden's most controversial
act for the Western Powers, and while permtting military traffic to Norway may
have been the most controversial act for Norway, ft was clearly the decision to
153
allow the transport of approximately 15,000 German soldiers from Norway to 
Finland which became the most controversial act for Sweden's internal political 
debate. Unlike the Norwegian transit which could be somewhat justified sine# the 
fighting had already stopped there, the Finnish transit was obviously done in 
connection with an imminent attack against the Soviet Union. The transit m s  such 
a divisive question that it threatened to end the national unity government. The 
only other issue which posed such a threat was the proposed ban of the Comunist 
Party. * Even the last mentioned case proved to be less divisive than the 
Finnish transit, since the Social Democrats’ refusal to support a ban did not 
cause the government to fall, but a similar rejection of the Finnish transit 
would have undoubtably caused the government to fall.
Since the debate over the Finnish transport was the government's most 
divisive during the war, a look at the various political groups' standpoint on 
this particular issue gives a good indication of the general attitude differences 
they held. Therefore, after quickly summarizing the events which took place, a 
longer discussion will follow on the government's internal debate. In this unique 
case, it was not merely the elected politicians who influenced the debate, but 
also the king and military leaders. Consequently, their influence must el so be 
Included in the discussion. Finally, since the majority of Sweden's polite
-39*
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l*4ders feared that denying the Germans permission for the transport would have 
severe consequences, it is of historical interest to see whether those fears 
•ere justified,
TRANSPORT TO FINLAND
On June 22, 1941, Germany demanded permission to transfer one military div-
1$5
ision through Sweden from terway to Finland. Gunther recommended that they
116
transfer tin division by sea, but Schnurre Immediately refused. That same day
both Hansson and Gunther consulted the king on the matter. Hansson claimed that
the king had threatened to abdicate if Germany was turned down* GUnther, however,
157
has always denied Hansson's interpretation of the meeting. Carlgren suggests
that while the king's exact words will never be known, Hansson was able to use the
threat in order to persuade a reluctant parliament and Social Democratic Party
158to approve the transport request.
After consulting with the king, Hansson called a special meeting of his 
Social Democratic Party's parliament members on July 24. The prime minister per­
suaded h1s collegues to take two votes. The first vote would decide whether or 
not the party would support the transport request. The second vote would decide 
whether or not the party would switch its position in the Interests of "unity," 
if the other parties differed with them. An overwhelming majority voted against
the transports in the first vote. Wahlbaek reports that the total was 159 against
i eg
and only 2 in favor. However, on the issue of unity with the other parties, 
there was 72 to 59 plurality with 39 abstentions. Hans De Geer and Jarl Torback 
argue in their book on modern Swedish history that the abstainers wanted to wait 
for the bourgeois parties1 answer before making a decision.
Once the Social Democratic parliament members made their decision, Hansson 
conferred with the other party leaders. Both the Conservative and Agrarian Party 
leaders reported that an overwhelming majority in their parties favored granting
the German request. Meanwhile, the liberal Party leader reported that about 2/3s 
of his party also favored an approval.1** Since all the bourgeois parties favor­
ed an approval, the Social Democrats were obliged to follow suit (because of the 
second vote they had taken). So It was only a matter of formality when the 
parliament was allowed to debate and vote on the issue.
Immediately after being Informed of the Swedish government's decision, the 
“Engelbrecht Division* began Its journey on the night of June 25.^  That night 
Hansson made a speech 1n which he emphasized that the government would try to main­
tain Its independence. The word "neutrality" was no longer appearing In Hansson 
and Gunther's speeches.1** Meanwhile, the government asked the press to describe 
the decision as being made mainly to help Finland, since the country had allied 
Itself with Germany in the hopes of regaining land lost in the previous war with 
Russia.1** It was also emphasized that it was a one-time deal and would not be 
allowed again. The government stuck to this declaration on July 31 when Germany 
requested permission to send more troops,1** but they were allowed to ship extra 
troops through Swedish territorial waters.1®7
SWEDEN'S INTERNAL DEBATE
Four major people or groups contributed most to Sweden's “Engelbrecht" de­
bate: 1) the king, 2) the military, 3) the bourgeois parties and 4) the Social 
Democratic Party with Hansson as Its most Important representative. Even though 
the first three groups were united in their support of the transfer, the Social 
Democrats were a potential stumbling block since they held a majority in both 
houses- Since the Social Democrats were the most decisive factor In the debate, 
the first three groups will be examined first so that one can see the context in 
which the Social Democrats' decision was made.
m i i r n
Even though it is not known whether or not the king would have abdicated
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if the German's transfer request were dcnied, it is known that he favored its 
approval. It was considered greatly desirable by all politicians (except the 
cowminists) to have the king's support for their policies. During the crisis 
which the world war brought* the king was seen as a national symbol who could 
guarantee the country's unity and provide moral leadership. w  furthermore* he 
insured that Hitler would have a more favorable attitude toward Sweden since the 
Nazi leader saw him as a guarantee that Sweden would carry out an acceptable or 
at least tolerable neutral policy.*6® Hansson and the Social Democrats were 
well aware of the king's importance* even if they did not necessarily like it. 
furthermore, they had to keep in mind the bourgeois party politicians whom 
according to one Social Democratic journalist, "could not even think of vetoing 
the king."*6®
The Military
The military leadership was strongly in favor of approving the transit. One
former cabinet minister wrote in his memoirs that the military generally saw a
171
negative response as being "adventuristic." Some officers recommended doing
more than simply approving the transfer. Per G. Anderson notes that General Axel
Rappe, who was then chief of staff, argued that since Sweden was encircled by
Germany and had little chance of defending itself against an eventual invasion,
the country should accept the roll as Germany's "flank" and support the war 
17?
against Russia.
An even more far-reaching stance was taken by Commander-in-Chief Thornell. 
Already several months before the invasion of the USSR by Finland and Germany, he 
recommended that Sweden actively support Finland if and when the invasion took 
place. Leif hjbrkman gives two reasons for Thbrnell's position.*^ First of all, 
if Sweden voluntarily helped Finland, the country could avoid German pressure to 
do so. It is better to choose a policy than to be forced into it by a power. 
Secondly, if Finland received Swedish assistance, it would be less dependent on
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Germany.
Xke Uhl in names three factors that caused Thiornell to support military aid
to Finland.*** The first factor was prestige: if Sweden voluntarily helped
Finland, it couldn't be humiliated by German demands to make concessions. The
second factor was strategy: if Finland received a "safer” Eastern boarder* tNn
Scandinavia would be better protected from invasion. The third factor was
ideological: Sweden should help fight communism. He even suggested banning
Sweden's Communist Party so that Germany could not interfere in the country's
internal politics by demanding such a ban.
Needless to say, when German demands finally came for transporting the
Engelbrecht division, Thornell advised compliance. He argued that it was absurd
175to have a war with Germany to prevent them from helping Finland.
Twenty-one years after the Engelbrecht transfer, Thornell defended the 
decision without mentioning viding Finland.**® Instead, he claimed that Sweden 
hadn't sufficiently armed itself to face a German attack. Once the rearming was 
accelerated, Sweden was able to display more courage in its German policy.
BjBrkman's historical research casts doubt on TMSrnell's version. He points 
out that during the period in which Sweden was considering granting Germany trans­
port permission to Finland, Th’drnell actually cautioned against mobi!ization be-
177
cause Germany could perceive it as a "hostile" act. Furthermore, Hansson 
recorded In his journal that approximately one month before approving the trans­
port, he needed to emphasis to Thornell that Sweden's policy hadn't changed and 
that it needed military plans to defend itself against all (ie. even German) 
aggression.**®
The Bourgeois Parties
As mentioned above* the bourgeois parties all favored allowing the transport. 
For the most conservative elements* the thought of having a war with Germany in 
order to prevent that country from helping Finland was especially repugnant.
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In retrospect, wrote the Conservative Party leader Gosta Bagge, he was "convinced
that ... the Swedish population would never get involved in a catastrophic war
1 7 0
against Germany if the German demand was to help Finland.“ Unlike TKornell,
Bagge only favored granting a one-time transfer and was opposed to all concessions
iso
which would not be only one time.
GQnther agreed with both TK&rnel1 and Bagge that risks should not be taken to
1 81
prevent Germany from helping Finland. He did not think that there was an 
immediate risk of German retaliation if their demands were denied, but he worried
over the implications it would have for future German-Swedish relations. He
had no reason to assume that Germany’s eastern blitzkrieg would be any less
successful than its northern, western ami southern ones had been. Both British
and American military experts had only given the Soviet Union a few months to
live. Once Russia was conquered, Sweden would be seen as a country which must
be liquidated under the New Order 1f it had an unfavorable rel* fcionship with 
184
Germany. While denying that the transfer would hurt German-Swedish relations,
its approval would not hamper Sweden*s relationship much with the Western Powers,
185
since they too would like to see communism defeated. (It should be remembered 
that at the time in which the transport was being debated, the Soviet Union had 
not yet joined the Allies, instead they still had a non-aggression pact with 
Germany).
Even though not all of the non-Social Democratic cabinet members shared 
fiJnther,s viewpoint, they were united in their desire to grant the Engelbrecht 
transport. Furthermore, since he was foreign minister, he carried great in­
fluence among the bourgeois cabinet members. So GQnther and Bagge are good 
examples of the attitudes held by ths conservative cabinet members. In fact,
Andreen claims that the cabinet members from all three bourgeois parties had
1 8 7
fairly similar viewpoints.
The Social Democrats' Strateoy
The Social Democratic policy was determined by two different goals: 1) a 
desire to prevent the transport of the Engelbrecht division, and 2) a wish to 
maintain unity within the government. The unity goal insured that the Social 
Democrats would have to consider their coalition partners' position when making 
their decision. The situation can be with the help of the diagram below.
DIAGRAM 1:
Should Germany be allowed to transport 
the Engelbrecht division through Sweden?
Social Democrats
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No
Be' *7Teois 
Parties
Yea
If the bourgeois parties could be persuaded to refuse the transport, then
both goals could be achieved at once (box 1). This was what the Social Democrats
were hoping for when they voted overwhelmingly against the transport during the
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first vote taken at tnelr meeting. Hansson was doubtful that the bourgeois 
parties could be persuaded and therefore anticipated the goal conflict when he 
requested that a second vote be taken.
When the Social Democratic members 1n parliament voted the second time at 
their Meting, they had to choose between their two goals (boxes 3 and 4). In 
order to explain why the unity goal was chosen over the goal of preventing the 
transport, the perceived consequences of each choice will be discussed.
DISAPPROVAL:
ho Yea
unity
1
disunity
2
disunity
3
unity
4
If the Social Democrats had refused to permit the transport, then disunity 
would have been created within the government. The bourgeois parties would have 
undoubtably left the government before taking responsibility for leading Sweden 
into such a large conflict with Germany, especially when it also meant going 
against Finland's wishes. Since the king also opposed a conflict with Germany 
on the issue, a constitutional crisis could occur. The king would have had two 
choices: either appoint a minority bourgeois government or abdicate. The former 
would lead to an ineffective government since the Social Democratic majority could 
veto all government acts; while, the latter would be a great blow to the country's 
morale.
Even if the king did not abdicate and the Social Democrats were allowed to 
continue running the government alone, it would present some very difficult 
problems. First of all, the government would lose much support and it would be 
hard to govern efficiently with the king, the military and all the bourgeois 
parties in opposition. Secondly, the emergence of purely Social Democratic govern­
ment would be considered a hostile act by Hitler. Without the king's support, 
Hitler would have lost his guarantee that Sweden would pursue an "acceptable" 
policy. Hitler would certainly consider Sweden a country worth liquidating when 
given the chance, and a disunified Sweden would not be able to defend itself very 
well.
On the other hand, there were valid reasons for disapproving the transport. 
First of al'li it was the morally correct choise in their opinion, because the 
country's neutrality should not be given up in order to help a fascist victory. 
Secondly, it did not matter much if Sweden had favorable relationships with 
Germany if Sweden helped them win the war. A fascist dominated Eurooe would have 
no room for Social Democratic politicians. Some Social Democrats even suggested 
unding over the government to the bourgeois parties so that "Germany's friends"
log
could take responsibility for the pro*German decision. With the Social
Democrats1 respect saved* they would be able to offer the Allies a reputable* 
anti-fascist alternative once Hitler was defeated. As mentioned above* if Hitler 
was not defeated, they would have been eliminated as a political organization 
regardless of their decision on the Engelbrecht transport.
UNITY:
A unified government would be in a much better position to deal with the 
Nazi threat. The populace would show much greater willingness to defend itself 
If it had faith in its leaders. In contrast, disunity could be exploited by the 
Nazis if they played one side against another. For example* the Nazis could find 
collaborators by announcing that if certain people were in the government and 
certain internal political measures were taken (such as banning the Communist 
Party) then an invasion would be avoided. If all the major political groups 
united* then it would be much harder for the Germans to find collaborators.
Unity would also present some immediate advantages. It would prevent a 
constitutional crisis at a time when Sweden could least afford it. A unified 
government which allowed the transport would also Insure that Sweden would not be 
attacked in tne near future. Meanwhile, it would give the country more time to 
improve its defenses so that it could be bolder against the Nazis later on. 
Moreover, if favorable relations could be maintained with Germany in the short 
run and the Allies won the war* then German occupation could be avoided. A wrong 
move now could lead to German occupation even if the Allies eventually won the war.
If Germany's success continued against the allies* it would still be wrong to 
hand over the government to the "German friends" in the cabinet. The Social Demo­
crats received a majority of the population's votes and the party had a respons­
ibility to protect these people's interests. As long as Sweden was allowed a sem- 
blence of independence* the Social Democrats should continue their responsibility 
for the country's future.
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THE DECISION:
The day before the Social Democratic meeting was held* Justice Minister Karl
Gustaf Westman observed that Hansson opposed the transit on moral grounds, but
was willing to "transform" his feelings in the negotiations if the consequences
of his refusal were too big*-"*®® HKgglbf was also given the impression that
Hansson was willing to accept the transfer.191 Tage ErVander, who eventually
became Hansson1 s replacement as party leader and Prime Minister, writes in his
182
memoirs that Hansson did not try to force his opinion at the party's meeting.
But he condedes that Hansson was "even more convincing" when he gave the arguments 
for approving the transfer than when giving the arguments against it. Moreover, 
Erlander records that after Hansson's analysis, he was convinced that the decision 
would be in favor of the transport.19* Although it is impossible to know whether 
Hansson was the deciding factor in the Social Democrats' vote, many members must 
have found it hard to oppose their own leader. A more important reason may have 
been the realization of the risks which disunity brought. Only a few months 
previously, Hitler had taken advantage of Yugoslavia's disunity by launching an 
invasion.
GERMANY'S STRATEGY
Since the supporters of allowing the Engelbrecht Division's transfer often 
used their fear of German reprisals as the excuse for supporting it, it is inter­
esting to see how the transfer was seen from Germany's viewpoint. BjiVkman's 
research shows that during the planning stages of the Soviet invasion, Hitler did 
not think that it would be possible to transport a division through Swedish 
territory.19* He favored sea transport, but the Navy opposed the idea, so he 
suggested using air transports. The German military leadership eventually drew 
up three plans.19* The first two counted on transports through Sweden, while the 
second called for the transports to be carried out by sea. The third alternative 
was the worst from a military standpoint, especially because during the planned
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invasion time - in the middle of May - it would be too icy. Nevertheless, as the
planning progressed, it was built on the assumption that Sweden would not allow a
197
transfer through its territory. On April 7 of that year, the plans were changed
19ft
so that all the transfers would occur by sea. ,
From the evidence Bjorkman gives, it appears that the Germans were not expect* 
ing to receive Sweden's approval. In addition, they do not seem to have considered 
taking any kind of military action against Sweden if approval to transfer troops 
was not given. Since sea route was the worst military option for Germany, a re­
fusal would have hurt Germany's campaign against Russia. Therefore, Germany 
would have become more hostile toward Sweden for not helping the crusade against 
Communism. Swedish leaders undoubtably feared that the worsened relations would 
have caused Hitler to consider invading Sweden after his expected victory in the 
east. The problem with this rationale is that an eastern victory would have made 
Hitler so powerful that he would have invaded Sweden afterwards regard1 ess of how 
good Swedish-German relations had been unless Sweden would have been willing to 
voluntarily give up its independence.
SUMMARY
The German demand to transport the Engelbrecht Division through Sweden turned 
out to be the most controversial issue for the Swedish government. The bourgeois 
party leaders were fearful that a denial could lead to German reprisals. Even 
though Germany had not counted on receiving Sweden's approval and had no plans 
for reprisals if approval was not given, Germany would probably have taken revenge 
later on in the war if given the chance. The majority of Social Democrats were 
willing to take this chance and favored rejection of the German demand. While the 
Social Democrats showed themselves willing to take the risk of future German re­
prisals, they were not willing to give up the government's unity which had been 
such an asset to the country's war policy.
CHAPTER 7 
CASE 4:
GERMAN INFLUENCE ON 
SWEDEN'S INTERNAL POLITICS
Critics of Sweden's policy during the war often point to what they perceive 
to have been Germany's Influence on the country's Internal politics. These 
accusations are usually made concerning three Issues: 1) censorship, 2) the 
discussion of banning the Communist Party, and 3) the Internment of Communists. 
The validity of these charges will be examined while discussing the context in 
which these policies were carried out.
CENSORSHIP
Life would have been much easier for the Swedish government 1f it could
have claimed that free speech was allowed In the country, and that 1t had no
responsibility for what Individual citizens said or wrote. Unfortunately, Sweden
was not allowed off the hook so easily by the warring nations. As Hansson said,
"It doesn't help us if we believe that foreign policy and freedom of the press
loo
should not be mixed together. The others do 1n any case.” The German govern­
ment, 1n particular, held the Swedish government responsible for what was printed 
In the press. Whenever articles appeared which were negative toward Germany, the 
German delegation was quick to Issue a protest. 00 As early as November, 1939,
Sweden's Minister 1n Berlin reported that the Swedish press was the main reason
201
for the deteriorations in German-Swedlsh relations. Under such circumstances, 
the Swedish government felt that 1t was necessary to exercise censorship over the 
mass media.
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Censorship was carried out in different forms. In the print media, one of 
the most open forms mbs confiscation. Gustaf Andersson 1 Rasjon, who as 
CORim/nications Minister as well as the liberal Party's leader, recorded in his 
memoirs that it was Gtinther who ordered the confiscations and Justice Minister 
Westman who executed them. *• In total, over 300 newspapers and magazines were 
confiscated from 1939-1943.203
Another open method of controlling the press was the issuance of transport 
bans. The Communist Party's five newspapers in addition to the anti-fascist
Trots A111 were forbidden to be transported through Sweden/ Although the
Communist papers could not be transported until 1943, the ban on Trots Allt
205
was lifted in the beginning of 1941. Thus, the ban for the most part involved
Communist papers. Historians Krister Wahlback and Goran Boberg report that the
206pro-Nazi newspaper, Sverioe Frltt. was also banned for a while.
In addition to the open methods of curbing the press, the government
practiced some less obvious methods as w*ll. In 1940, an information bureau was
formed (Statens informatlonsstyrelse) with the tasks of reporting to the press
on the state's activities and with the further task of fighting foreign propa- 
207ganda. In addition, the board kept tabs on the country's newspapers and
reported on them to the authorities. Furthermore, the board gave instruction and
advise to the newspapers on “publishing questions." A press jury (pressnamnden)
20Q
was also set-up by members of the press to act as a self-policing organization.
Self-censorship was also encouraged by cabinet members. For example,
Gunther once said in a speech that “nothing gives me greater fear for the future
than the Swedish press' attitude to and the way it represents the transformation
210
process which Is now going on in Europe." One of the most persuasive techniques 
was used by Hansson. He took advantage of his position as the Social Democrats' 
leader and wrote to all of his party's newspaper editors and Informed them that 
as representatives for the nation's largest party, they had a special responsibility
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for what was written.
In the most extreme cases in which neither the less coercive methods of 
censorship nor the more coercive ones worked, newspaper editors were prosecuted* 
Trots Allt's editor Ture Nerman was once jailed several months for his paper 
articles.212
Prosecution and censorship were not limited to newspapers and magazines. It
included books, films, theater and even public speeches. One former parliament
member was prosecuted for a speech he made claiming that the Nazi were planning a
state coup.213 Norway's exiled president was not even allowed to give a public
214speech even though it had been planned before the German invasion.
While it might have been embarrassing for the government to forbid their 
neighbor's president to speak, it may have been even more embarrassing for Sweden's 
prime minister when a book which was published by his own party's publishing company 
was censored.215 The book, Qm ock tusen falia (Even Though Thousands Fall), was 
written by a Hungarian refugee who wanted to stimulate opposition to fascism.
Not only were several books banned, several films and plays were banned as 
well, Amen# the most noteworthy of the plays was John Steinbeck's "The Moon Has 
Gone Down.1,215 The most famous film which was forbidden was Charlie Chaplin's 
"The 6r«at Dictator. ' Jn fact, the film was not allowed until November 
1945 * six months after Germany's surrender • and even then many scenes had been 
clipped out.
Criticism Of The Policy
Critic*, of 5w* an's censorship have emphasized two points: either they be­
lieve that It weakened the population's willingness to defend Itself or that It 
was unnecessarily pro-German. The most outspoken advokate of the former view­
point was Undin. He thought that If people were not made aware of how horrible 
the Nazis were, then they would be less willing te fight against a German 
occupation.218 For example, If Nazi propaganda were not countered, then people
-$ 2 -
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might actually believe that the Norwegians liked being occupied, If the press 
were prevented from reporting the truth about Nazism, then the population would be 
less able to resist Nazi propaganda.
According to Casparsson, the press was* in fact, prevented from describing
the Nazi atrocities.219 It could not even describe the concentration camps. In
regards to Unden's Norwegian example, one book shows that the Swedish population
was not allowed to read about the torture going on there. In just one day, 17
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papers were confiscated for reporting about a tortured Norwegian.
Even though many Swedes opposed censorship, even those who could accept It 
were critical of what they perceived as the government's pro-German bias. Stat­
istics show that around 80% of the confiscations occurred against anti-Nazi 
articles. In contrast, the Nazi press accounted for only 10% of the con- 
fiscations. A communist member of parliament complained of this one-sideness 
in a speech. He reminded the parliament that when Russia complained about the 
Swedish press during the Soviet-Finnish war, the government responded that the 
country had a "free" press. In contrast, when Germany complained, the govern­
ment complied with their censorship requests.
Social Democratic journalist Casparsson was also critical of the government's 
one-sidedness. He writes that "One was not permitted to say what one knew to be the 
truth on the conditions in German prison camps or about the work and business re­
lationships in the countries which Germany had conquered. At the same time, one
could, in spite of the censorship law, say just about whatever one wanted on Soviet
224
Russia's government, its high officials and ambassador."
Casparsson found the lack of censorship against the pro-German press 
especially objectionable since journalists were not able to counter the propaganda. 
He cites an example from an article written by Aftonbladet, which at the time was 
the nation's largest evening paper
Because of the steps that Germany has now taken, it 1s the 
Germanic races among the world's many races which can save 
the world's cultured people from the danger hanging over 
us which comes from the asiatlc Soviet Russia's terrorism;
Sweden's position In the campaign is beforehand clear and 
given.
Aftonbladet was even allowed to print an article praising the Germans' policy in 
the Warsaw ghetto.***
In order to counter the paper's propaganda* Casparsson helped the Swedish 
Trade Union publish a competing evening paper. Even though the union was connected 
to the Social Democratic Party, the party opposed the paper. According to
92 7
Casparsson* Hansson felt that the paper would hurt German-Swedish relations.
Of course# Casparsson's case is not so extreme since it was at least allowed to 
be published - despite the lack of support from the Social Democratic Party. A
* ppQ
more extreme case is shown by Ake Thulstrup. He mentions that Trots Ant 
carried out a campaign against Per Deutsche in Schweden for its anti-British 
attacks which contravene Sweden's neutrality. Instead of censoring Per Deutsche* 
the government censored Trots Allt for its campaign.
Perhaps the most extreme example of the government's unwillingness to censor 
Nasi propaganda concerns Uppsala professor Israel Holmgren. He wrote a book 
entitled Nazisthelvetet (The Nail Hell). The book was confiscated because of its 
anti-German title and he was sentenced to four months imprisonment although he was 
later pardoned. Since the government did not approve of his title* he changed it 
To Nazistoarad1 set (The Nazi Paradise) and the book was allowed to be published.
Defense of the Policy
Defenders of the government's policy can point out that not all the censored
articles were anti-Nazi. On various occasions, newspapers were censored for
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articles attacking the Allies. Moreover, extreme forms of antl-semltlclsm 
were not allowed, even 1f Aftonbladet did publish articles praising the Warso 
ghetto. For example, the German ant1-sem1t1c film "Jud $iiss" (Sweet Jew)
was banned. If the government had censored the pro-German press more extensive** 1 
ly* it would have angered Germany, and the main reason for incorporating censor* 
ship was to prevent German reprisals.
Against critics of this seemingly accommodating attitude toward Germany* 1t 
can be argued that a little censorship was better than a Nasi occupation. Ivor 
Anderson, who was a journalist and Conservative member in parliament, uses Norway 
as a good example of the need for Swedish press restraint. He claims that Giinther
was very strongly “personally engaged" in working to prevent persecution of Nor-
232
wegians and Danes during their occupation. When he asked the Swedish press to 
be cautious in reporting on the occupation, it was to prevent reprisals in those 
countries.
Justice Minister Westman argued that all countries exercised censorship
during the war, and Sweden’s censorship was not as strict as that in most countries.
He claimed that during the war that Britain censored its press much more than 
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Sweden. ' He added that the communist press was outlawed in England, but it was 
permitted in Sweden. In spite of the limited censorship, HagglUf argues t h a t ^
: jj
The Swedish press was more unrestrained in Its attacks against |
the Nazi regime than that of any other country, and this press |
campaign was continued when the war had started. 1
COMMUNIST PARTY BAN?
When the Soviet-German war b<*oke out, many Swedish politicians feared that the 
Nazis would demand that the Communist Party be banned, leaders of the Conservative
Party, the Agrarian Party and Gunther all felt that it would be better to ban the party
235
than to wait for an embarrassing German ultimation. For the Conservative party, it ] 
was also a chance to actuate an old demand to ban the communists dating back to 
1933.236 Both the Social Democrats and the Liberals opposed to the idea, but were will- 
ing to consider a ban if it included the pro-Nazi organizations as.well. . The Conserv- \
231
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atives were more concerned over the Communists than the Nazis because the former 
was much larger than the latter; nevertheless* they were Milling to consider a 
double b a n . ^  Durir\ he negotiations* the different parties cound not agree oil 
which organizations should be banned for being pro-Nazi.^ Later 1t became fcnew» 
that Berlin Mould rather have no Communist ban than one which included National 
Socialists.^ The $Med1sh parliament finally passed a Ism which sharpened the
penalty for treason, and consequently, neither the communist nor Nazi organizations
241
were banned.
COMMUNIST INTERNMENT
Once the Sovlet-FInnish war began, the Swedish government began taking re­
pressive measures against Communists, because of their support for Russia. They 
were often Interned by the police and many were forced to spend time living In 
internment camps.^ Per Francke claims that although the original internments 
were related to Nazi demands, the arrest of Conmunist leader Sven Linderot during 
the summer of 1941 was "ordered from Nazi Germany. J He points out that during 
that period, an increasing number of Communists were interned and attributes it to 
the military's desire to cooperate with Hitler's holy crusade against Communism 
which was about to begin with the Soviet invasion.
In defense of the Internments, Tage Erlander claims that Communists were In- 
volved 1n acts of sabotage and did present a legitimate security threat. He 
adds that their sabotage was motivated by their desire to fight Nazism. If this is 
correct, then one could expect attempts to sabotage the transfer of the Engelbrecht 
Division through Sweden which of course would have had great consequences for 
German-Swedish relations.
SUMMARY
Germany was able to Influence Sweden's internal politics more than any other
-5 7 -
country. Attempts to curb free speech were carried out mainly to prevent German 
reprisals. The proposed Communist Party ban along with the Internment of Communists 
was also influenced by German pressure; however their support of Russia in the Soviet* 
Finnish war along with strong anti-Communist feelings in the military and conserv­
ative politicians were also factors. Fear of Communist sabotage was another factor 
in the actions taken. Therefore, it would be wrong to blame the internments and 
proposed party ban merely on German pressure, although their pressure made it much 
easier for these policies to be carried out.
PART I I I
CONCLUSION
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CHAPTER 8
WAS SWEDEN'S POLICY MORALLY JUSTIFIABLE?
Supporters of Sweden's policy toward Nazi German claim that It was realistic, 
while critics claim that it was opportunistic and pro-German. Those who adhere to 
the former viewpoint claim that Sweden's policy saved many people's lives by pre­
venting a Nazi invasion and by taking in refugees. Those who adhere to the latter 
viewpoint claim that Sweden's policy caused the death of many by allowing Germany 
to transport soldiers through its territory and by refusing to take in more ref­
ugees. Any evaluation of Sweden's policy toward Nazi Germany should take these 
arguments into account.
IN FAVOR OF SWEDEN'S POLICY
Christer Wahlgren admits that Sweden's policy was not heroic* but it put the 
country's safety first.*4  ^ From 1939 to 1942* it was not advisable to challenge 
Hitler because the country hadn't satisfactorily rearmed. After the United States 
entered the war and it became apparent that Germany would not open a new front* 
Sweden became more critical of Germany.
HSfgglbf supports Wahlgren's viewpoint. In the beginning of the war* Sweden 
had to try to gain time while 1t rearmed. During the first few years of the 
war* Sweden tried to make as few concessions as possible* At the same time* 
Sweden's trade w ’th Germany was "kept within the limits of her own needs." In 
1943* when Sweden had rearmed and Germany began losing the war* the transit agree­
ments were cancelled.*48 Meanwhile, Sweden began reducing trade with Germany and 
by the end of 1944* all trade had stopped.
In reviewing Hagglb'f and Wahlgren's arguments, 1t should be kept in mind that
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Sweden is a small country, which was much weaker than the Great Powers and during 
much of the war, it was surrounded by Nazi Germany. Furthermore, if it provoked 
an attack, it could not count on much help from the Allied forces and would there^ 
fore not be able to hold out much longer than a few months at most. The atrocities 
that a Nazi occupation would have brought the Swedish population hardly need to bd 
mentioned.
Not only did the avoidance of a Nazi occupation save many Swedish lives, it 
saved many foreign lives as well. The most important example of this is the ref­
ugees whom Sweden took in. Tage Erlander points out that by December 1, 1944,
249
91.520 refugees were in Sweden in addition to over 83,000 Finns. Out of the
91.520 refugees, 31,520 were Baltic, 30,000 Norwegian, 15,000 Danish and almost
5,400 German.250 Moreover, the Swedish government helped approximately 7,000
Danish Jews escape Denmark when word got out about Nazi intentions to transport
251
them to concentration camps. The Swedish governments help in organizing the
escape lead one Danish Jew to write that the Danish Jews could not have been saved
252
"without the Swedish people and Swedish authority's consent and help.' In
addition, many Norwegian students escaped depor t  Jon to Germany by fleeing to
253
Sweden. The refugees also included many well known political leaders, such as 
Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky as well as many Norwegian politicians and labor
A P .
leaders/9 At the end of the war, the Swedish Red Cross also assisted 1n the
255
evacuation of many prisoners from concentration camps.
In addition to saving lives by allowing in refugees and helping to evacuate
people from concentration camps, Sweden provided special assistance to its neighbor-
258
ing countries. The greatest amount of help was given to Norway. In the begin­
ning of the German invasion, Sweden sent helmets, compasses, maps and other military
aid to Norway. After Norway was defeated, money was funneled to their underground
257 »
organizations though Stockholm. According to Gjores, an average of 750 care
258packages a day were also sent to Norway.
Another important way in which Sweden helped Norway was to train “police 
units" which were really troops that could enter the country once the occupation 
e n d e d . T h e y  would be able to quickly establish order in the country so that 
no extremist groups could hinder the return to democracy. Former Cabinet Secretary
Erik Boheman adds that approximately 3,000 Norwegians were flown to England so
260
that they could unite with British military units*
Military aid also went to Denmark. Danish military personnel were trained 
261
as well as Norwegian. A study by Ulf Torell finds that five comprehensive
262
batalions in total were trained in Sweden. In addition, Erlander claims that
263
Sweden police helped smuggle weapons to the underground in Denmark. He gives
264
the total as 7.3 million cartriges, 4,100 machine guns and 5,100 gernades.
The above mentioned actions which Sweden took to save the lives of many people 
and help its neighbors could only be taken because Sweden managed to avoid occupation. 
Supporters of Sweden's policy argue that it took a realistic foreign policy which 
unfortunately required certain concessions to the Nazis in order to be able to 
provide its assistance. Thus, Sweden was of greater help as an unoccupied 
country than it could have been as an idealistic conquered one.
AGAINST SWEDEN'S POLICY
Critics of Sweden's foreign policy claim that it was pro-German, opportun­
istic, and that not enough was done to help its neighbors and others suffering from 
the war. According to Leni Yahil, when Gunther became foreign minister, "Swedish
265neutrality took on in degree the charactor of a caretaker for Hitler's interests."
266
An even harsher critique comes from Krantz, who writes:
It is easy to see that "neutrality" in the war's beginning 
was none other than opportunism. One counted on a German 
victory and it was intended to keep Sweden in good terms 
with the new world rulers.
Krantz continues his critique by mentioning that Sweden continued granting
- 6 1 -
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Germany favors even after the great loss at Stalingrad when 1t became obvious that
267
Hitler would lose. An example of how much Sweden helped Germany, Krantz points 
to a paper written by Staffan Soderblom from the Swedish Foreign Ministry. The 
paper was given to Germany in order to show all the help Sweden had given them in 
the war against Russia. According to the paper, during 1941, the following aid 
was given to Germany: 700 courrier planes were allowed to fly over Sweden to and 
from Finland; 525,000 soldiers were carried between Germany and Norway by train;
4.000 train cars carrying war material were allowed to travel from Norway to
Finland; and 48 troop and war material ships carrying 650,000 tons of war supplies
268were transported through Swedish territorial waters under Swedish escort.
Rune Karlsson's study shows that oil products were also transferred through
269Sweden to German submarines in Northern Norway. Furthermore, during the war
over 2,140,000 German soldiers were carried by Swedish trains in addition to
270
100.000 cars carrying war material.
It isn't only the concessions to Germany which made critics feel that Sweden's 
policy was overly pro-German; certain statements made during the war seem to re­
veal pro-German feelings. The most extreme case is the king's congratulatory note 
sent to Hitler after he began his Soviet invasion/ Another example is Gunther's
declaration that it was not In Sweden's interests for Germany to face total defeat
272
because it would upset the balance of power. Once Gunther even recommended
setting up a new apolitical government which would have a better understanding of 
273
Germany's needs.
In addition to the accusations that Sweden carried out a pro-German policy
came accusations that not enough was done to help others. The harshest criticism
in this regard concerns Sweden's refugee policy. Particularly tragic is the fact
that Jewish refugees were not admitted into the country until after the war start-
274
ed, and by that time, it was too late for most of them. Although no statistics 
are available on the number of Jews refused entry, Hilding Hagberg shows that
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Sweden's refugee policy was not the only action which caused criticism from
Norway. A Norwegian government report reveals that the country requested
750*000 liters of oil and gas from Sweden during the April invasion.^ When the
request was denied, Norway asked for 500,000 liters. After being turned down the
request was dropped to 100,000 with the same result.
Another incident which caused resentment occurred when the Norwegian king and
286several ministers tried to seek temporary refuge in Sweden. They only wanted 
to stay a few days in order to avoid German bombing. They were told they could 
come in, but no guarantee was made that they could leave. They later sneaked in
287
and were allowed by the local authorities to leave without Stockholm's knowledge.
The Danes were not as bitter as the Norwegians, particularly since the occu­
pation was not as harsh in the beginning so that there weren't as many people 
seeking refuge in Sweden. Of course the main reason that they were less resentful 
was that Germany diln't use Swedish territory to send troops to Denmark m  it did in 
Norway's case. Still, Sweden can be criticized for not doing as much as i*t could
to help Denmark, especially since it followed a very restrictive refp§#e policy as
288long as Germany was winning the war.
Sweden's refugee policy toward Denmark, Norway, and f*sn*cially, ummtrn- £ews 
has beer very heavily criticized. It is used «r$ an example o* how -.Swede* swipesedly 
followed an opportunistic policy* guided by self-interest msHead o f h e p e o p l e  
m  need, The large concessions made toward Germary as well as tie will in§*ie$$ 
mmy Swedish leaders to openly support the Nazi crusade agawst tm m nim  1*$ 
to further charges of opportunism.
CONCLUSION
Any evaluation of Sweden’s policy toward Nazi Germany must take info consider­
ation the harsh circumstances Sweden found itself in. It is a small country whici 
was surrounded by one of the most ruthless and powerful war machines in modern
history. The country would have had little chance in stopping a Nazi invasion, and 
the consequences of the resulting occupation would have brought great misery to the 
Swedish population. Under such circumstances, it is understandable that the coun­
try would make some concessions that did not coincide with a strict neutrality.
Critics of Sweden's policy have claimed that it was not only opportunistic, 
but even that it was counting on a German military victory. Sweden's policy was 
opportunistic in the sense that it attempted to limit the country's hardships as 
much as possible. In retrospect, however, what country - apart from those adhering 
to the Axis - did not follow such a policy? It may be asking too much of Sweden 
to show great boldness when the much stronger countries did not do the same. France 
and Britain did not show much boldness when they signed the Munich Pact. The Soviet 
Union did not show much boldness when it signed the non-aggression treaty with 
Germany. The United States did not show much boldness when it turned away Jewish 
refugees and declared itself neutral until it was bombed by Japan. So how can one 
expect a small country, which was surrounded by Germany and economically depended 
upon it, to show great boldness?
The charge that Sweden's policy was guided throughout most of the war with 
the belief that Germany would win the war may be correct. Some prominent officials 
such as Gunther and Thtfrnel 1, seem to have been motivated by such thoughts. Iron­
ically, the policy that Sweden actually followed was much more suitable for a 
country counting on an Allied victory. If Germany had won the war, then the result 
far Sweden would have probably been so horrendous that it would have been much 
letter for the country to give up its neutrality and actively oppose the Nazis. On 
leather hand, if the Allies were to win, it would have been best for Sweden to 
ihaes* the policy it did: one of making as many concessions as needed in order to 
aweii occupation.
Mmm if Sweden's policy was realistic, given the country's situation, it doesn't 
•lieit morally justifiable. One can argue that no country should make concessions
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that help a fascist victory. The lives saved by avoiding an occupation* along with 
the thousands of refugees whose lives were saved can be used as justification for 
Sweden's policy. The biggest moral problem with Sweden's policy was the country's 
unwillingness to make sacrifices in order to help others at a time when millions 
were making sacrifices to fight fascism. According to Erlander* Sweden followed 
a restrictive refugee policy mainly because of fears chat a large Jewish immigration 
would have caused "deep going charges in Swedish society.M As someone of German- 
Jewish descent* I find it hard to accept that the death of half of my family can be 
morally justified by pointing to the “deep going changes in Swedish society" that 
their immigration could have brought.
Sweden's attitude towards refugees shows that the country's policy was not 
based on morally justifiable grounds. On the contrary, the policy was motivated 
mostly by self-interest. It was not entirely motivated by self-interest, however; 
otherwise no action would have been taken to save the Danish Jews. It should also 
be remembered that Sweden's policy was not comprised of one man* but rather several 
different men with different viewpoints who favored different policy directions*
As the decision to allow German soldiers to travel through Sweden to Finland shows* 
the bourgeois party leaders and cabinet members favored following a more con­
ciliatory policy toward Germany than the Social Democrats wanted. In fact* the 
Social Democrats used mostly moral 1 Stic arguments to oppose the transfer. However, 
the Social Democrats cannot escape responsibility for what happened because they 
had a majority in both houses of parliament, in addition to the post of prime 
minister. In most cases they chose to support unity with the bourgeois parties 
over a policy based on morality - with the refusal to back a ban of the Communist 
Party being the major exception. Finally* it should be added that the decision 
not to let in Jewish immigrants was made by a Social Democratic government* before 
the unity government was formed. Consequently* none of the political parties which
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took part in the war-time coalition can claim to have supported a morally just­
ifiable policy during World War II.
♦The Agrarian Party was a junior partner in the Social Democratic government before the 
coalition government was formed, but it did not hold any of the ministries which dealt 
with immigration or foreign policy questions.
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claims that around 7,GOO Jews escaped to Sweden, while 500-600 were sent to Nazi 
concentration camps. Scobble, p. 137, writes that around 6,500 Jews escaped to 
Sweden. T. K. Derry, A History of Modern Norway. (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 
1972), p. 395, claims that only around 906 Jews escaped to Sweden.
For a description of how the escapes were carried out, see Erlander, pp.
110-111; and YahiT, pp. 278-283.
Yahil. ET Demokrati. o. 278.
*01e Kristian Grimnes, HJemmefrontens Ledelse. (Norway: Universitets- 
forlaget, 1977), p. 115.
*See Erlander, p. Ill; Grimnes, Et flyktninaesamfane p. 13; Grimnes, 
HJemmefrontens. p. 122; and Hambro. pp. 38-39.
“ ’Hlggl&'f, Britain, p. 36. See also Carlgren. Sweden, pp. 215-216; and Carl 
gren, Svensk. p. II); and Hlgglbf, "A Test...,, p. 169.
25®But no weapons were given. See Kgl. Utenriksdepartement, Noroes forholo 
' e under kr1oen^^940-1945. volume 1 of 3, (Oslo, Norway: fiyidendal Norsk
Brimnes, HJemmefrontens, p, 254.
258GjBres, Vreda vindar, p. 145.
259Boheman, Pi vakt. p. 284 gives the number at approximately 30,000. Carlgren, 
Swedish, p. 159, claims appropriations were made for 1,500 police troops and up to
8,000 reserves. T. K. Oerry, A History of Scandinavia. (London, UK: Georoe Allen 
and Unwin Ltd., 1979), p. 348, gives trie total number at 8,700. Popperwell, p. 
158, writes that 1,500 police were trained and 10,000 reserves. Daniel Woker, Die 
Skandinavischen Neutralen. (Switzerland: Verlag Paul Haupt Bern und Stuttgart, 
1978), p. 71, puts the number at 12,000.
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263Erlander, 1940-1944. pp. 129-131.
264Ib1d., p. 133.
265Yahil, ET Demokrati. p. 279.
288Krantz, Nar tyskarna, pp. 248-249.
267Ibid., p. 249.
268,'Underst8d fbr den tyska och finska krlgsforingen i norden," 20 January 
1942, cited in Krantz, pp. 191-192.
269Karlsson, Sli stoppades, p. 12.
270Karlsson, $1 stoppades, p. 10. Derry, Scandinavia, p. 341, claims over 2 
million passengers were carried.
271
See footnote 76.
272
Carlgren, Swedish, p. 46; and Krantz, p. 143.
27^Ublin, Februari krlsen, p. 189.
274Yahilt ET Demokrati, p. 281; and Hildina Hagberg, Rod bok ore svart tide 
(Uddevall, SwedirT: bo Cavefors Bokforlag, 1966), pp, 241-243.
27^Hagberg, Rod bok, p. 243.
278Yahil« ET Demokrati, p. 281,
9JO
Grlmnes, Riemmefrontens. p. 13.
280Ib1d., p. 25.
281 Ibid., p. 26. See also Erlander, 1940-1944, p. Ill; Derry, Modem Norway, 
p. 390t and Carlgren, Swedish, p. 212.
282Er1ander, 1940-1944. p. 113.
283Tore11, HJalo till Danmark, p. 35.
* * S r  limes, n yditnlnoesaafann. {9. 300-302.
28®Kg1. UttmrllisdepartewHrt, eel. 1, pp. 184-185.
286Kg1. Utenriksdepartement, Norqes forhold til Sverige under krlqen 1940-1945 
volume 2, (Oslo, Norway: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1948), pp. 75-76; and Lie, pp.
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